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Youth (un)employment continues to cause UK policy-makers major headaches. The 
unemployment rate for 16-24 year olds was 16.2% in the quarter from October to 
December 2014, compared with 5.7% for the general working population.
1
 Further, 
27%of unemployed 16-24 years olds had been unemployed for over 12 months.
2
The 
Resolution Foundation estimates that37% of those employed on zero hours contracts 
are aged between 16 and 24,
3
 indicating that young people are often consigned to 
insecure, precarious jobs when they find work. 
 
In this context, age discrimination legislation has significant potential to 
address institutional barriers facing younger workers. By prohibiting direct and 
indirect discrimination in employment on the basis of age, the Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031, and now the Equality Act 2010, offer young 
workers at least the possibility of tackling discriminatory conduct and practices. 
However, the case of Lockwood v Department of Work and Pensions
4
provides a 
telling critique of how well young people might be able to challenge age 
discrimination in employment and assert their employment rights. 
 
1. FACTS AND CASE HISTORY 
 
Ms Lockwood was employed by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) as an 
administrative officer from the age of 18 for eight years. In 2007, Ms Lockwood’s 
position was ‘declared surplus’ and she applied for release under a voluntary 
redundancy scheme. Under the scheme, Ms Lockwood was entitled to compensation 
in accordance with the Civil Service Compensation Scheme (CSCS). The CSCS 
provided for compensation for voluntary redundancy of: 
 
(a) one month’s pay for each year of service, plus 
(b) the lesser of: 
(i) one month’s pay for each year of service given after 5 years service and 
(ii) one month’s pay for each year of service given after the employee’s 30th birthday, 
plus 
(c) one month’s pay for each year of service after the employee’s 35th birthday, 
 
subject to a maximum compensation cap of three years’ pay. 
 
Ms Lockwood, then aged 26, was entitled to £10,849.04 in compensation 
under the scheme. Had Ms Lockwood been aged 35 at the time, her total payment 
would have been £28,539.62. Thus, Ms Lockwood received around 38% of the 
payment that a 35 year old would have received.  
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Ms Lockwood challenged the disparity in payments under the Employment 
Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031 reg 3 (now Equality Act 2010 s 13) 
as a form of direct discrimination. The parties agreed that Ms Lockwood’s treatment 
constituted direct age discrimination. The two issues to be determined were:  
 
1. Whether Ms Lockwood was in materially comparable circumstances to employees aged 35 or 
above whose employment was terminated, in accordance with reg 3(2);
5
 and 
2. If so, whether the disparity of payment was justified (that is, whether it was a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim under reg 3(1)).  
 
The Employment Tribunal (ET) held that there were material differences between 
those aged below 30 and those above the age of 35. Those below 30 were likely to 
have ‘lesser financial and family obligations’, and therefore ‘could generally be 
expected to react more easily and rapidly to the loss of their jobs and greater 
flexibility could be expected of them.’6 Thus, the groups were in materially different 
circumstances, and there was no age discrimination given the requirement in reg 3(2).  
 
In the event there was age discrimination, the ET held that this was justified as 
a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The aim of the CSCS was to 
‘produce a proportionate financial cushion until alternative employment was found, or 
as a bridge to retirement and the receipt of a pension’. The means of achieving this 
aim, via staged payments and a banding process, was proportionate due to six 
considerations: 
 administrative workability required clear bands, and could not allow for the 
consideration of individual circumstances; 
 leveling-up (to pay all employees the same as older workers) would be a 
‘substantial burden on the public purse’;7 
 statistics showed that younger employees had fewer family and financial 
obligations and suffered unemployment for a shorter period; 
 workforce recruitment and planning supported the scheme; 
 ‘cogent business aims’ and proportionality outweighed the discriminatory 
effect of the scheme;
8
 and 
 the unions had not sought to challenge the scheme or argue it was 
discriminatory. 
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) upheld the ET’s decision that there were 
material differences between those aged below 30 and those above the age of 35. 
Further, if there was discrimination, the ET was entitled to conclude that the measures 
were a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
 
2. DECISION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
In the Court of Appeal, Ms Lockwood argued that: 
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1. The ET had misapplied reg 3(2), and was wrong in concluding that there was no less 
favourable treatment; and  
2. The ET had applied an incorrect test of material justification under reg 3(1), ignored material 
considerations and took irrelevant considerations into account. 
 
A. The comparator 
 
Rimer LJ, delivering the leading judgment in the Court of Appeal, dealt decisively 
with the comparator issue, labeling the ET’s approach ‘wrong’. 9  There was ‘no 
difficulty in identifying a comparator’, namely someone aged over 35 who was, or 
would have been, in all material respects in the same position as Ms Lockwood in 
their employment at the DWP.
10
 Ms Lockwood’s age could not be used to make her 
circumstances materially different to the comparator.
11
 
 
Using a comparator of someone aged over 35, ‘there was only one answer to 
the question whether she had suffered such less favourable treatment, namely yes.’12 
Ms Lockwood would be paid substantially less money upon leaving her employment 
than someone aged over 35. When the ET ‘rejected this straightforward conclusion’, 
it adopted an approach that was ‘self-evidently wrong’.13 According to the Court of 
Appeal, there was ‘no question that Ms Lockwood suffered less favourable treatment 
than her comparator’.14 Lewison LJ put this conclusion rather pointedly: 
 
When she left her job Ms Lockwood received less money than a 36 year old would have 
received. Why? The answer is: because she was younger. The ET said that the statistics 
showed that someone like Ms Lockwood would be able to react more easily and rapidly to 
losing her job than a 36 year old. Why? The answer again is: because she was younger. They 
also said that someone like Ms Lockwood would be less likely to have heavy financial 
responsibilities than a 36 year old. Why? The answer yet again is: because she was younger. 
Accordingly all the suggested reasons for concluding that Ms Lockwood did not suffer age 
discrimination turn out to be factors consequent upon her age. They are, therefore, not 
legitimate differences for the purpose of deciding whether discrimination has taken place.
15
 
 
The comparator issue raised by this case is, on the face of it, fairly straightforward: 
courts and tribunals should not use characteristics relevant to age to determine 
whether a comparator is in materially different circumstances to the claimant. 
Characteristics associated with particular age groups may be relevant to justification 
(see further below), but should not constitute material differences for identifying a 
comparator.
16
 
 
What is concerning is how long this issue took to resolve, and that the EAT 
endorsed the ET’s approach. This perhaps reflects broader issues with the use of a 
comparator to establish discrimination, and enduring confusion regarding 
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whatattributes should be assigned to a comparator.
17
 The risks and ‘dangers’ of 
identifying a comparator and focusing on material differences associated with a 
protected characteristic were acknowledged in AL (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department by Baroness Hale: ‘it is wrong to focus on the personal 
characteristics which are inherent in their protected status to argue that their situations 
are not analogous.’18 
 
Similarly, in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
19
 
Lord Nicholls cast doubt on the usefulness of the comparator requirement as a 
determining factor in discrimination claims. These doubts were reinforced by Lord 
Hope’s judgment in that same case: 
 
[T]he need for a comparator has been one of the most problematic and limiting 
aspects of direct discrimination as defined in the legislation about 
discrimination on grounds of sex and race. … the choice of comparator 
requires that a judgment must be made as to which of the differences between 
any two individuals are relevant and which are irrelevant. The choice of 
characteristics may itself be determinative of the outcome… . This suggests 
that care must be taken not to approach this issue in a way that will defeat the 
purpose of the legislation, which is to eliminate discrimination  … .20 
 
Drawing on Lord Nicholls approach in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary,
21
 Collins et al. argue that once less favourable treatment has 
been established by reason of a protected characteristic, the use of a comparator 
should be largely a formality.
22
 However, Lockwood shows that the use of a 
comparator continues to generate confusion, even where less favourable treatment is 
clear.
23
 Thus, there is a need to reconsider the role of the comparator in discrimination 
cases, particularly where less favourable treatment is clearly evident. 
 
B. Proportionality 
 
While Ms Lockwood was successful in relation to the first issue, her claim floundered 
in relation to justification. In reviewing the ET’s treatment of the proportionality 
issue, Rimer LJ held: 
 
[T]here is no substance in the challenge to the ET’s reasoning upholding the 
respondents’ objective justification case. The ET’s reasons were manifestly 
full and conscientious. There is no doubt that the ET understood the applicable 
test; it gave the most careful consideration to the evidence; and it applied the 
test with obvious care and, in my view, appropriate rigour.
24
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Thus, Ms Lockwood’s claim could not succeed, as the discrimination was held to be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. 
 
3. RECONSIDERING PROPORTIONALITY 
 
In the ET, Ms Lockwood was self-represented, and failed to produce any evidence to 
counter the DWP’s factual submissions on proportionality. As noted by Rimer LJ: 
 
The ET in this case, as in most cases, was deciding an adversarial contest 
between opposing parties. It was no part of its function to step into the arena 
and assume an inquisitorial role in its inquiry as to the question of 
proportionality raised by regulation 3. It had to deal with that issue on the 
basis of the evidence before it.  …all [Ms Lockwood] is asking for is a 
remission of the case to the ET for a re-consideration of the proportionality 
exercise. Any such re-consideration would be on the same evidence.
25
 
 
This raises serious issues about the conduct of proceedings in the ET, particularly 
given changes to legal aid funding
26
 and the rise in self-represented litigants.
27
 Thus, 
the evidential issues raised by Lockwood may have broader significance for thinking 
about how we address discrimination claims.  
 
While Ms Lockwood did not present evidence challenging the DWP’s 
submissions on proportionality, it is informative to consider whether they might have 
been rebutted using contrary evidence (and, thus, whether Ms Lockwood’s challenge 
on this second issue could have been upheld had different evidence been presented at 
first instance). 
 
A. Administrative workability 
 
The ET held that administrative workability of the CSCS required clear age bands, 
and could not allow for the consideration of individual circumstances. The Court of 
Appeal summarised the evidence of the DWP as follows: 
 
There are some 600,000 employees across the Civil Service and related bodies 
who are potentially covered by the CSCS. It is important to ensure that the 
eligibility criteria and level of benefit applicable to particular individuals are 
easily understood and administratively workable. There must be what were 
referred to as ‘bright lines’; i.e. rules that can be operated across the Civil 
Service in order to achieve consistency and operational effectiveness. It is not 
possible to look at each individual case to determine benefits for each 
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individual; the rules must allocate benefits by reference to clear rules that can 
be applied with certainty in every case.
28
 
 
The aim of payments under the scheme was to provide ‘financial protection that 
reflects [individuals’] presumed personal circumstances’, without actually considering 
what those circumstances were.
29
 How an individual would react to the loss of their 
job, or their personal financial position, would be ‘very difficult if not impossible to 
calculate’.30 
 
However, issues with assessing individual circumstances do not necessarily 
mean that age bands are required. Indeed, the CSCS rules were changed in 2010, after 
Ms Lockwood’s departure from the DWP, to remove ‘age banding’ for younger 
employees. Voluntary redundancy payments under the CSCS now consist of one 
month’s pay for every year of service, up to a maximum of: 21 months for those 
under scheme pension age; and 6 months for those over scheme pension age. This 
appears to undermine the need for age banding for those aged under 35 under the old 
scheme. 
 
Further, determining ‘presumed personal circumstances’ on the basis of age is 
highly likely to lead to injustice and inefficiency, and looks ‘suspiciously like 
stereotyping’. 31  In this case, the ET found that Ms Lockwood’s personal 
circumstances were ‘more akin’ to those aged over 35.32 It would be revealing to 
consider how many other young employees at the DWP were in a similar situation. 
This clearly illustrates how damaging age stereotypes can be, and the ‘mismatch 
between reality and past assumptions or stereotypes’.33 
 
In this case, both parties accepted the need for an ‘age banding’ approach to 
determine the payment of redundancy money, and to allocate limited resources among 
employees who were assessed by the employer to have different needs at different 
ages.
34
 Thus, it was accepted that some disparate treatment of employees of different 
ages was necessary.
35
 It is possible that this concession was wrongly made, as it 
certainly undermined Ms Lockwood’s arguments relating to justification. 
 
B. Costs argument 
 
Second, the ET held that the disparate treatment was justified on the basis that 
leveling-up (to pay all employees the same as older workers) would be a ‘substantial 
burden on the public purse’.36 The costs of leveling-up must be seen in the broader 
context of public service redundancies: the ET heard evidence that there were around 
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34,000 departures on CSCS terms from 2005 to 2008,
37
 at an overall cost of £337 
million.
38
 This is obviously a huge cost to the public purse, and represents a dubious 
form of workforce management (see further below). 
 
Recent cases considering the relevance of cost considerations in justifying age 
discrimination have endorsed a ‘costs plus’ approach: costs alone are not sufficient.39 
However, it may be possible to define a legitimate aim sufficiently broadly to make 
costs an inherent part of the legitimate aim (e.g. to carry out a legitimate redundancy 
exercise without additional cost to the employer).
40
 Given the ET’s acceptance of the 
administrative workability argument in this case, having recourse to cost 
considerations was entirely acceptable as part of a ‘costs plus’ approach. Thus, this 
aspect of the judgment is in full accordance with existing case law. 
 
C. Statistics regarding the superior position of young people  
 
Third, the disparate treatment was justified using statistics that showed that younger 
employees had fewer family and financial obligations (and therefore should be 
expected to be more ‘flexible’), and suffered unemployment for a shorter period.41 
According to the ET, this was evidenced by:  
 ‘the higher turnover of employees in the different age categories’: turnover of 
Civil Service employees up to the age of 24 was 8.8%; as compared with 
3.9% for employees aged 35 to 39; and  
 ONS statistics relating to young people moving into employment from 
unemployment:
42
 an unemployed 18–24 year old was 11.2% more likely to 
move into employment than someone aged 35–49; and a 25–34 year old was 
8.1% more likely.
43
 
 
The ET also found that young people had fewer financial commitments compared 
with their older colleagues. This was based on the average age of marriage (in 2007, 
34 for women and 36 for men); and the average age of first time house buyers (from 
2002–2007: 32 or 33; and by 2009: around 37).44 
 
There are a number of issues with these conclusions. First, at a basic level, the 
ET was unclear regarding which age groups were being compared at what stage. In 
effect, the CSCS created three categories of redundant workers: those under 30 
(including Ms Lockwood); those aged between 30 and 35; and those 35 or over. To be 
proportionate, there should have been some justification for each of these divisions 
(and, more particularly, for the division affecting Ms Lockwood). However, the 
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statistics that were presented tended to focus on those under 25 and those over 35, 
rather than considering the three different groups affected by the scheme.
45
 
 
Second, the statistics relied on by the DWP, and accepted by the ET, present 
only a partial and distorted picture of youth employment in the UK. For example, 
even at the time of Ms Lockwood’s redundancy, youth unemployment was already 
increasing, and had been doing so since 2005.
46
 This is depicted in Table 1. Indeed, 
unemployment for young people was substantially higher than older adult 
unemployment from 1992 to 2014.
47
 This may reflect young people’s limited skills 
and experience, which mean they ‘are less likely to be employed than older adults 
even during relatively benign periods in the labour market.’48 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
All ages 4.8 5.4 5.3 5.6 7.5 7.8 8.1 7.9 7.6 
< 25 12.8 13.9 14.3 15.0 19.1 19.8 21.3 21.2 20.7 
25 to 74 3.3 3.8 3.6 3.9 5.6 5.8 5.8 5.7 5.4 
 
Table 1: UK unemployment rate by age groups (annual average, %), 2005–13  
(Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey) 
 
Further, movements into employment from unemployment are likely to be 
influenced by many factors other than age.
49
 Even if young people are more likely to 
move into employment from unemployment than older workers (and this has been 
questioned by some studies),
50
 this may well be linked to the lack of employment 
protection for younger workers.
51
 Thus, these statistics may become circular, as a lack 
of employment protection (and resulting job mobility) justifies a further downgrading 
of protection for young workers. 
 
There is also no guarantee that younger workers entering employment from 
unemployment will find a ‘decent’ job. Young people are disproportionately 
represented in precarious work.
52
 While precarious work may arguably be a 
                                                 
45
This may reflect issues with the available statistics, which rarely distinguish different age bands to 
this extent. 
46
Tom McInnes and others, Monitoring Poverty and Social Exclusion 2014 (Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 2014) 74. 
47
ibid. 
48
ibid. 
49see Steven Pinch and Colin Mason, ‘Redundancy in an Expanding Labour Market: A Case-Study of 
Displaced Workers from Two Manufacturing Plants in Southampton’ (1991) 28 Urban Stud 735; 
David Bailey and others, ‘Employment Outcomes and Plant Closure in a Post-Industrial City: An 
Analysis of the Labour Market Status of MG Rover Workers Three Years On’ (2012) 49 Urban Stud 
1595. 
50
Mike Donnelly and Dora Scholarios, ‘Workers’ Experiences of Redundancy: Evidence from Scottish 
Defence‐dependent Companies’ (1998) 27 Personnel Review 325, 335. 
51
see, for example, Lawrence M Kahn, ‘The Impact of Employment Protection Mandates on 
Demographic Temporary Employment Patterns: International Microeconomic Evidence’ (2007) 117 
The Economic Journal F333. 
52Robert MacDonald, ‘Precarious Work: Risk, Choice and Poverty Traps’ in Andy Furlong (ed), 
Handbook of Youth and Young Adulthood: New Perspectives and Agendas (Routledge 2009) 168–
69.See further Surhan Cam and others, ‘Contingent Employment in the UK’ in Ola Bergström and 
Donald W Storrie (eds), Contingent Employment in Europe and the United States (Edward Elgar 
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temporary and natural dynamic of labour force transitions for younger workers,
53
 it 
may equally be a trap, particularly for those at the bottom end of the labour market 
(e.g. in the cleaning and catering industries).
54
 For the less privileged or advantaged, 
precarious work may come to define their experience of employment.
55
 Even 
relatively prosperous young people have seen their wages, earnings and incomes 
badly affected by the crisis.
56
 According to Hills et al, the ill effects of the crisis ‘have 
been concentrated on one particular generation’, namely those born in the 1980s.57 
This may lead to ‘scarred’ employment careers for an entire generation.58 Further, the 
crisis has impacted unevenly across different geographical localities.
59
 Sweeping 
generalisations regarding the employability of younger workers are clearly 
inappropriate in this context.  
 
Third, due to their family and financial responsibilities, the ET felt that older 
workers had ‘greater need’,60 and therefore warranted higher redundancy payments. 
In the Court of Appeal, counsel for Ms Lockwood argued that the CSCS and ET had 
not sufficiently considered the ‘family and financial responsibilities of co-habitees in 
their twenties’, like Ms Lockwood.61  Further, the ET had failed to scrutinise the 
statistical evidence laid before it by the DWP: ‘evidence of how young people in their 
twenties would react to unemployment was no more than an assumption; [the DWP] 
drew inferences from the statistics that were not justified; and [these] inferences 
involved a stereotyping of young people that was also not justified.’62 However, the 
Court of Appeal held that, on the evidence before them, the ET ‘was entitled to be 
satisfied on the evidence that the position of cohabitees in their twenties was reflected 
in the statistics before them and that they did not represent some special class whose 
presence operated to skew the statistics.’63 
 
In this case, Ms Lockwood had not ‘provided evidence to show that such 
cohabitees have onerous financial commitments, such as mortgages and children, to 
the same degree as those who are married’.64 Had Ms Lockwood looked for evidence 
to rebut the DWP’s arguments, it would have been readily available. ONS figures for 
2013 show that only 53% of live babies born that year were born to parents who were 
married or in a civil partnership. At the same time, 84% of babies were born to 
parents in a stable long-term relationship – that is, those married, in a civil partnership 
or cohabitating. Thus, unsurprisingly, cohabiting couples often have children together. 
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Cohabitees are also likely to own property together, with law firm Slater & Gordon 
describing mortgage as ‘the new marriage’.65 
 
The focus on cohabitees in the Court of Appeal may have been more 
distracting than helpful in determining whether the CSCS was proportionate. The real 
question for the ET should have been whether financial commitments reliably varied 
by age and, if so, whether this was relevant for determining if the scheme was 
proportionate. Just because young people do not have a mortgage or children does not 
mean that they lack onerous financial commitments or have less ‘need’ for 
redundancy payments. Individuals struggle to pay rent just as much as they struggle to 
keep up with mortgage repayments,
66
 and mortgages may have more scope for 
flexibility and adjustment than rental payments. Not having a mortgage in no way 
provides an accurate representation of an individual’s financial commitments, 
particularly as younger buyers are increasingly excluded from the housing market.
67
 It 
seems contrary to logic and unfair to use young people’s difficulties in entering the 
housing market as a justification of age discrimination in employment: those with 
mortgages are the ‘lucky ones’ in the modern housing market.68 Similarly, individuals 
may put off marriage and parenthood due to job insecurity and difficulties finding 
appropriate housing,
69
 which is likely to be reinforced and exacerbated by age 
discrimination in employment. Young workers are also disproportionately employed 
in low-wage jobs, as demonstrated in Table 2, meaning they are less likely to have 
savings to ‘tide them through’ until they find new employment. 
 
Year 2006 2010 
All ages 21.77 22.05 
< 30 49.97 40.61 
30-49 14.36 14.68 
50+ 18.49 18.31 
 
Table 2: UK Low-wage earners as a proportion of all employees (excluding apprentices) 
by age (Source: Eurostat Structure of Earnings Survey) 
 
Thus, the ET’s equation of marriage and property ownership with financial 
commitment and ‘need’ rings hollow, as young people increasingly cohabit or live in 
de facto relationships; are excluded from the property market; and incur other 
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financial responsibilities. Indeed, financial management may actually be easier if 
individuals are married or cohabitating in joint-income partnerships, as costs can be 
shared. Further, expecting young workers to be more ‘flexible’, and presumably to 
move to find new employment, is unrealistic when 26% of 20–34 year olds are now 
living in the family home, largely as a result of growing unemployment and 
workplace insecurity.
70
 In sum, then, the ET’s use of statistical evidence risks 
devolving into a vicious cycle: age discrimination can be justified against younger 
workers, as they have fewer personal and financial obligations; and young people 
incur fewer personal and financial obligations as they have less employment security.  
 
While the ET’s use of statistics may be criticised, even more concerning is 
where the Court of Appeal did not require evidence to support the ET’s assertions. 
Counsel for Ms Lockwood challenged the ET’s statement that ‘someone who starts 
work in the Civil Service aged 20 is less likely to view the job as a long term career, 
as against someone who starts at the age of 35’.71 According the Court of Appeal, this 
was either justified by the DWP’s turnover statistics (which do not speak to the 
employees’ intentions or valuing of their work) or else ‘was within the specialist 
knowledge of the lay members of the ET’. Again, this looks suspiciously like age 
stereotyping, relying on assumptions that younger workers are less committed to their 
job.
72
 
 
D. Recruitment and planning 
 
Fourth, the ET held that the CSCS was supported by considerations of workforce 
recruitment and planning. According to the DWP, 
 
In order to attract, engage and retain high calibre staff, the Civil Service had to offer terms 
that would both be inviting to prospective staff and act as an incentive to existing staff. This 
included not only a reasonable package of terms during the period of employment, but 
generous terms after leaving service. This is part of work force planning. Early termination 
terms must be attractive, so that individuals volunteer for departure when work force numbers 
need to be reduced.
73
 
 
While this may support the scheme generally, it does not explain why the age bands 
were justified. Further, if there were 34,000 departures on CSCS terms from 2005 to 
2008
74
 across a potential workforce of 600,000 employees, this represents a 
significant level of voluntary redundancy payments, creating a turnover of nearly 6% 
on that basis alone.
75
 It is arguable that voluntary redundancy payments on this scale 
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represent an unreasonable use of public money, and are certainly a blunt and costly 
tool for ‘workforce planning’. 
 
E. Union support 
 
Finally, the ET noted that the unions had not sought to challenge the scheme or argue 
it was discriminatory, supporting the proportionality of the differential treatment. This 
case obviously placed the unions in a difficult position: while older members would 
likely wish to retain their enhanced redundancy payments, younger members were 
being put at a distinct disadvantage. This reflects broader issues with unions 
intervening in equality matters. While unions may play a significant role in promoting 
good practice on equality issues,
76
 UK trade unions have generally come to the 
equality agenda slowly and reluctantly. Further, younger workers are generally 
underrepresented in union management and are often poorly unionised.
77
 While some 
unions are working to address this imbalance,
78
 it is unrealistic to assume that the 
union would object to the CSCS in its entirety, or to make the unions’ lack of 
objection an indicator of proportionality. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The terms of the CSCS scheme challenged in Lockwood are now of only historical 
significance: since the scheme’s amendment in 2010, the provisions that directly 
discriminated against younger workers have been removed. Thus, this judgment is 
most relevant to those who took voluntary redundancy prior to 2010, and is unlikely 
to have much practical significance going forward. 
 
However, the judgment provides significant insights into the likely challenges 
young claimants will face in proving that age-related provisions are not proportionate. 
This case strongly affirms the lesser weight afforded to age as a protected 
characteristic: age discrimination is seen as ‘different’ to other forms of 
discrimination,
79
 and is regarded as less harmful or detrimental (and, therefore, less 
worthy of protection).
80
 It is inconceivable that a similar provision explicitly linking 
redundancy pay to gender or race would be legally or socially acceptable, or that such 
a provision would be able to be objectively justified under legislation. By treating age 
discrimination as ‘different’ and less harmful than other forms of discrimination, the 
law continues to condone ageism and perpetuate ageist values, as illustrated by 
Lockwood.  
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Lockwood also flags ongoing issues relating to the use of comparators in UK 
discrimination law. Far from being a ‘formality’, the selection of a comparator is 
causing confusion and uncertainty in the ET and EAT, and may be leading to the 
dismissal of otherwise legitimate claims. While the Court of Appeal’s decision has 
hopefully dispelled some of this confusion, it is timely to review whether we should 
require a formal comparator, particularly in cases of direct discrimination. In the 
government’s response to the consultation on the Equality Bill, it noted that it had 
elected to retain the comparator requirement as it ‘reflects that discrimination is 
principally about equal rather than fair treatment.’81 Indeed, the government felt that 
courts would struggle to assess claims of discrimination without a comparator: ‘A 
comparator remains one of the best ways to measure “different” treatment.’82 The 
contrary view, as expressed by the Law Society and Discrimination Law Association 
in the consultation, was acknowledged by the EAT in Islington London Borough 
Council v Ladele:
83
 
 
[A]lthough the Directive and the Regulations both identify the need for a tribunal to determine 
how a comparator was or would have been treated, that conclusion is necessarily encompassed 
in the finding that the claimant suffered the detriment on the prohibited ground. So a finding 
of discrimination can be made without the tribunal needing specifically to identify the precise 
characteristics of the comparator at all. 
 
This is likely the better approach.  
 
The Court of Appeal’s approach in Lockwood can also be contrasted with recent 
CJEU decisions on age-based pay rates. The CJEU appears to treat payments that 
disadvantage young workers with a healthy degree of skepticism. For example, in 
Specht v Land Berlin
84
 and Hennigs (Social policy)
85
 it was held that basic pay rates 
determined by an employee’s age at the time of recruitment were not a proportionate 
means of recognising employee experience. Indeed, the CJEU in Hennigs refused to 
accept that older age was correlated with more onerous financial responsibilities: ‘it 
has not been shown that there is a direct correlation between the age of employees and 
their financial needs. Thus a young employee may have substantial family burdens to 
bear while an older employee may be unmarried without dependant children.’86 This 
approach stands in marked contrast to that in Lockwood.
87
 
 
Overall, existing cases indicate that the evidence presented at first instance, 
particularly regarding whether older workers have more difficulties finding new 
employment, will largely be determinative of the issue of justification. This places a 
high burden on self-represented litigants, who will likely need to challenge an 
employer’s statistical evidence at first instance (and, in all likelihood for younger 
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workers, without union support).
88
 A more inquisitorial system of adjudication for 
discrimination claims, which was explicitly distinguished in the Court of Appeal 
judgment from the ET system, could well have a use in this case. In sum, age 
discrimination laws may service to undermine, rather than support, younger workers’ 
already precarious position in the labour market. We can only hope (albeit 
unrealistically) that younger workers will somehow fall on their feet without legal 
assistance.  
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